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The main purpose of this study is to empirically examine 
and analyze the effect of early detection principles, 
comprising anonymous reporting, followed up reporting 
and reward system, on the encouragement of an individual 
interest in reporting fraud. The research was conducted at 
the Pratama Tax Office of South Sidoarjo. The samples used 
in this research were 53 respondents. Sample collection 
was done using saturation sampling technique. The results 
of this research show that followed up reporting has an 
effect on the encouragement of an individual interest in 
reporting fraud. In contrast, anonymous reporting and 
reward system have no effect on the encouragement of an 
individual interest in reporting fraud.1
Keywords: 
Introduction
Tax is one of the largest sources of state income 
compared to other sources of income derived from Non-
Tax State Revenues (PNBP), such as oil and gas sectors. 
Tax is also a top priority in financing the state budget and 
expenditure. Like other countries, especially in developed 
countries, the top priority of state revenue comes from 
taxes (Priantara, 2009: 2). So, income from taxes has 
become the mainstay in financing the development of the 
country and it is expected that there is no fraud in tax 
revenue.
On August 19, 2011, the Directorate General of Tax 
(DGT) increased the implementation of discipline by issuing 
bureaucratic reforms in the form of the Director General of 
Tax Regulation No. PER-22/PJ/2011, on the obligation to 
report violations and the handling of the whistle-blowing 
reports within the DGT. Whistle-blowing system in the DGT 
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is also intended to increase the participation of the 
public, especially the tax officers who actively 
supervise each other. Various cases dragging the 
tax apparatus in recent years have led to taxpayer 
skepticism in carrying out his tax obligations 
(Fasmi dan Misra, 2014). Therefore, whistle-
blowing system aims to restore public trust to 
DGT and create good governance.
The whistle-blowing system or hotline 
serves as primary defense tool to deter and detect 
fraud as it proves to have deterrent effect on 
potential actors (Priantara, 2013:186). Report to 
the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse 
released by ACFE consistently reports that 
most of the fraud detection is done by whistle-
blower. Whistle-blowing system has been used 
in various countries in the world, especially in 
developed countries, because its existence is very 
important in fighting against fraud. In the United 
States, the use of whistleblower system becomes 
a requirement for all public organizations 
(Zimbelman et al., 2014:109).
It is not easy to make the decision 
that can boost individuals to be interested in 
becoming whistleblower, because there are still 
some aspects that need to be taken seriously. The 
results of the research conducted by the Institute 
of Business Ethics in the Public Concern at Work 
(PCaW) report (2013) show that one of four 
employees who knew that fraud was happening, 
more than half (52%) chose to remain silent. There 
are several risks to be faced when becoming a 
whistleblower, not only on the position, property 
and safety of the soul, but also on the life of his 
family due to retaliation or intimidation. On one 
side, whistleblower is also considered as a traitor, 
libel, false. So, it can backfire for whistleblower 
who intends to report a crime scandal.
One of the basic principles of Regulation 
No PER-22/PJ/2011 is to boost whistleblower 
enthusiasm or early detection principles by 
requiring employees to monitor and report any 
violations / indications of violations within the 
DGT. As a counterpart of the obligation, the 
DGT provides “protection to the complainant”. 
The protection provided is to conceal the identity 
of the reporting party, in the event that the 
reporting party is willing to give his / her identity. 
However, to ensure the confidentiality, the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) (www.wise.depkeu.
go.id) appeals not to notify / fill in personal data 
such as name (anonymity) or the relationship 
between the reporting party and the perpetrators 
because the focus of MoF is only on the complaint 
information.
Deloitte, one of the largest Accounting 
Firms of Big 4, in its worldwide study concluded 
the reasons why the whistle-blowing system 
failed to detect any violations, one of which 
was the lack of anonymity (Zimbelman et al., 
2014:453). Several international studies are still 
debating between anonymous reporting and 
confidentiality. Furthermore, empirical studies 
show that confidentiality tends to be weak, as 
evidenced in the research conducted by Sumantri 
(2014), that the employee’s support for the 
confidentiality of the identity of the complainant 
is only 50%.
Another balance that has an important 
role in the implementation of whistle-blowing 
system is the early detection principles as 
stipulate in the Regulation No. PER-22 / PJ / 
2011. One of the early detection principles is 
to regulate the “follow up report”. According 
to Machzumi (2013), one way to increase the 
success in the application of whistle-blowing 
system is that the Ministry / agency needs to 
consider the aspect of guarantees to following 
up any reports submitted by the complainant. 
The results of survey on the effectiveness of 
the whistle-blowing system in the UK indicate 
that 74% of the major constraints a person not 
reporting any allegations of fraud are due to the 
assumption that the submitted report is ignored 
and not followed up (PCaW, 2013).
The other early detection principle is 
to regulate “reward” for whistleblowers who 
report illegal allegations within the DGT. The 
same thing is also applied in the US tax agency, 
that is, IRS (Internal Revenue Service) which 
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provides rewards to whistleblower. The result 
of the research conducted by Xu and Ziegenfuss 
(2008) shows that reward system has an effect 
on the interest in performing whistle-blowing.
The purpose of this research is to 
examine and analyze the effectiveness of 
the Directorate General of Tax (DJT) early 
detections principles, such as whistleblower 
identity confidentiality protection, follow-up 
report, and reward, in encouraging the whistle-
blowing interest The principles are provided as 
a counterpart to the obligation of employees 
to supervise each other and report allegations 
of fraud that occur in the work environment. 
The election of Pratama Tax Office of South 
Sidoarjo as the research sample is because 
in 2012 there was a tax levy bribery case 
involving PT Bhakti Investama committed by 
Supervision and Consultation Section Head of 
Pratama Tax Office of South Sidoarjo, Tommy 
Hendratno and a businessman named James 
Gunardjo. The Directorate General of Taxes 
(DGT) had monitored the suspect Tommy 
Hendratno since 2011, “he was monitored 
through whistleblower system,” said a Tempo 
source (Friday, 8/6/2012).
Reinforcement Theory
This theory argues that the factors that 
motivate a person in doing a job is a stimulus 
that will be received from the implementation 
of the job. The assumption is that a person 
will repeat a behavior when the behavior gets 
the desired consequences, and will stop the 
behavior when it has unintended consequences 
(Badrudin, 2014:200). However, this theory, as 
referred by Remender (1980), is more likely to 
ignore matters relating to social contexts, such 
as interacting with one another and focusing on 
the reflective activities already undertaken and 
experienced. He also asserted and criticized the 
reinforcement theory argued by Skinner (1962), 
that reinforcement theory not only emphasizes 
the stimulus (reward) or punishment, but also 
concerns the intent or purpose of one’s behavior.
The reinforcement theory tries to explain 
the role of reward in shaping certain behaviors. 
Hanafi (2003:319) states that if a behavior is 
rewarded with expected fun, the behavior will be 
repeated in the future. Conversely, if a behavior 
gets unpleasant reprisals or punishment, the 
behavior will not be repeated in the future. 
It would be much better if the stimulus runs 
naturally. There is a good indication if someone 
behaves as expected by the principal although 
the reinforced stimulus is no longer executed 
(Burgess and Akers,1966). 
The results of research conducted by 
Thorndike, as quoted by Nugraheni (2011), 
mention that: (1) Law of exercise, that is, if 
the association between stimulus and response 
often occurs, the association will form stronger. 
The interpretation of this law is the more 
often the knowledge that has been formed by 
the association between the stimulus and the 
response to be trained (used), the stronger the 
association will be; (2) Law of effect, that is, 
if the association formed between stimulus 
and response is followed by a satisfaction, the 
association will increase. This means that if a 
response given by a person to a stimulus is true 
and he knows it, the satisfaction will be achieved 
and the association will be strengthened.
In addition, Ivan Petrovich Pavlov’s 
research in Nugraheni (2011) suggests that 
by applying the right stimulus strategy, one’s 
behavior can be controlled and there will be 
repetition of the desired behavior, in this context 
the individual is unaware that he is controlled by 
the stimulus that comes from outside of him. This 
is in line with research conducted by Skinner 
(1958), that in the context of one’s behavior, 
the control of individual attitudes / behaviors 
can be done outside the reward factor. In this 
study Skinner (1958) conducted experiment on a 
gambler. A gambler faces two major possibilities: 
win (positive) or lose (negative). However, 
although he loses gambling, he still repeats his 
activities (gambling). From this experiment, 
Skinner (1958) concluded that the driving factor 
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is not only a reward, but also the satisfaction of 
the individual.
According to Hanafi (2003:319), the 
reinforcement process can be described as 
follows:
Stimulus  Responses  Consequences    
Future  Responses 
Related to the reinforcement theory, 
Hanafi (2003:319) explains that there is a 
certain stimuli, such as orders from superiors, 
which can encourage one’s behavior (eg, 
subordinates carrying out the order). As the 
individual can run the order well, there are 
certain consequences received, such as a salary 
raise. As the reward received by the individual 
is pleasant, in the future he will repeat the same 
response, that is, when he is ordered by the 
boss he will do well.
From the above explanation, it can be 
drawn a conclusion that one’s behavior can be 
controlled by a driving factor outside of him. 
The studies conducted by Remender (1980) and 
Burgess and Akers (1966) state that it would be 
much better if the amplifier / propulsion factor 
comes from within the individual, or running 
naturally.
Whistle-blowing
According to Miceli dan Near (1985), 
whistle-blowing is a disclosure by a member of 
the organization (former employee or current 
employee) for illegal, immoral or unlawful 
acts, and reporting the allegation to a party 
or organization that can take action on the 
event . Akers and Eaton (2009) define whistle-
blowing as an act of reporting wrong doing to 
internal or external parties. Whistle-blowing 
is increasingly referred to as part of good 
organizational governance for all organizations. 
Whereas , according to Dorasamy (2013), 
whistle-blowing can be considered as an 
employee action reporting unethical practices 
within the work environment, thus expecting 
investigations from the disclosure. In essence, 
whistle-blowing is a form of disclosure of illegal 
acts or corruption (Rachagan dan Kuppusamy, 
2013) . Based on some whistle-blowing notes 
above, it can be concluded that whistle-blowing 
is an employee action reporting fraudulent 
activity within the work environment to the 
competent authorities, expecting follow-up on 
the report submitted.
Anonymous Reporting
In developing whistle blower protection, 
specifically Walker (2014) proposes to 
employees how to report fraud anonymously. The 
reporting is a strategy so that the whistleblower 
will be in a safe and comfortable zone when he 
wants to report and avoid retaliation, because 
by reporting anonymously, the whistleblower 
will be difficult to trace (Transparency 
International, 2009). Anonymous disclosure 
is to report through channels by ensuring that 
the information conveyed without mentioning 
the sender’s address, providing untraceable 
phone calls, emails sent from a blocked 
account, the IT system ensuring anonymity and 
preventing it from reconnecting (Transparency 
International, 2009). Park et al., (2008), also 
defines anonymous disclosure as an employee 
reporting form of fraud that occurs by not 
providing any information about himself, and 
can use a pseudonym.
If employees must report violations 
through internal channels that do not guarantee 
anonymity, they may not provide information 
(Zimbelman et al., 2014). It is an effort to 
protect themselves against possible hazards. 
Thus, the complainants require the availability 
of anonymous channel provided by an 
organization.
Follow-Up Report
One important factor that hinder the 
potential of whistleblowers is the lack of 
confidence in the responsibilities of follow-up 
report mechanisms and the unclear procedure 
of follow-up reports. Therefore, it is necessary 
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to consider creating an environment that 
encourages a person to be interested in reporting 
fraud(Transparency International, 2009).
According to Robert Francis QC (2013), 
cited in the PCaW report (2013), a follow-up 
report is that the verifier responds sufficiently 
to a complaint report or to confirm correction 
of the report, so as to gain the confidence that 
the report will be noticed. It is not only physical 
protection to the whistleblowers, but also other 
factors that can generate a sense of respect and 
safety to report. As Chaurasiya et al., (2013) 
says, whistleblowers are reluctant to report 
fraudulent actions because there are several 
disruptions, such as firing, blacklists, threats 
and physical violence. The majority of issues 
occurring is that the whistleblower report is 
often ignored or not followed up.
Reward
The existence of reward in the 
application of whistle-blowing system has a 
significant role for its success. As indicated 
by the United States federal law, the False 
Claims Act regulates the granting of financial 
incentives to individuals who report fraud in 
the workplace. Rewards are often classified by 
social scientists, in the form of intrinsic rewards. 
Extrinsic rewards (financial incentives, benefits) 
are tangible goods that give satisfaction to those 
who are valued and often used to encourage 
the behavior of uncovering credible evidence. 
Extrinsic rewards are generally more effective 
at encouraging whistle-blowing (Callahan dan 
Dworkin, 1992).
A person who wishes to report a 
fraudulent allegation should be encouraged 
because being a whistleblower is not easy 
given the negative impact he will receive. Such 
encouragement may be a reward proportional 
to the obligation to report alleged fraud. 
According to an article written by Stiegler 
(2012), efforts to prevent corruption occurring 
in the workplace are conducted not only by 
imposing penalties on employees who receive 
bribes, but also providing monetary rewards to 
employees who refuse bribes and are willing to 
report them.
Hypotheses Development
The Effect of Anonymous Reporting on 
Whistle-blowing Interest
In the reinforcement theory, it is 
explained that by applying the right stimulus 
strategy, the behavior of a person can be 
controlled / driven and there will be repetition 
of the desired behavior, in which the individual 
is controlled by stimuli that come from outside 
of him. An employee can report fraud occurring 
in the workplace by using a pseudonym. The 
strategy is to avoid any threats or negative 
impacts when he will report and after the 
reporting. If the action has been realized and 
has an effect of improving the effectiveness 
of the organization to a better direction which 
is free from any form of fraud in the work 
environment and there is a feeling of comfort 
and security after reporting, the employees 
will likely repeat the same thing when they 
know illegal practices happening in workplace. 
A comfortable condition is obtained by an 
employee within an organization if there is 
a protective procedure to report fraud. The 
mechanism is very important because of its 
sensitivity. One of the reporting mechanisms 
required by SOX 2002 section 301 for 
public organizations is providing anonymous 
reporting channels for whistleblowers (Eaton 
dan Akers, 2007). In this condition, a person is 
free to submit his / her complaint without any 
fear of threats that endanger him / her.
Miceli and Near (1985) analyze whistle-
blowing with the main question is why some 
people report immoral or illegal acts and some 
do not. From the research, they managed to 
find one of the major factors why some people 
do not report. It is because they are afraid of 
the threat or retaliation from wrongdoer. So, it 
encourages a person to report anonymously to 
avoid potential threats of violence. It is shown 
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substantially by ACFE (2014) research results, 
that anonymous reporting is a way of avoiding 
the risk of backlash.
The study conducted by Gokce (2013) 
proves that the percentage of the majority of 
individuals who report illegal acts with an 
anonymous system is very high. The result 
of this study is similar to that of the study 
conducted by Nayir and Herzig (2012), that the 
majority of individuals is more likely to choose 
anonymous system with the aim to avoid the 
risk of threats.
However, the research conducted by 
Park et al., (2008) found that the application 
of reporting with anonymous systems in 
Turkey and the UK is relatively weak, 
whereas the application of this system is 
highly recommended as an effective strategy 
in combating fraud in South Korea. Based 
on the explanation described above, the first 
hypothesis proposed in this study is:
 H1: Anonymous reporting has an effect on 
whistle-blowing interest.
The Effect of Follow Up Report on Whistle-
blowing Interest
Full attention to the receipt of 
complaints aims to streamline the whistle-
blowing systems. Effective reporting system 
means that every report of complaints 
received will get a guarantee to be verified and 
reviewed. The verifier will serve responsibly. 
If a whistleblower’s complaint report is not 
responded, the whistleblower will be reluctant 
to report the alleged fraud for a second time 
or even none at all. Instead, the whistleblower 
will move forward in reporting fraudulent 
allegations if his reports are responded and 
acted upon. There is a strongly established 
association when the association between 
stimuli and responses is common. To 
encourage someone wishing to report a fraud, 
one of them is by informing the organization 
members that the report will be followed up. 
When the organization members respond to the 
information well and they believe that there is 
a guarantee of response to the whistleblower 
report, the whistle-blowing action will be 
stronger.
If the association formed between the 
stimuli and the response is followed by the 
satisfaction, the association will increase. 
Similarly, if an employee reports fraud and 
the report is certainly followed up, thenthe 
employees will feel satisfied because the report 
is not ignored. If the association is common, the 
behavior of whistle-blowing will also increase.
The handling of whistleblower report 
has a profound effect on the success and 
effectiveness of reducing fraud by applying 
whistle-blowing system. An experimental study 
conducted by Schultz et al., (1993) shows that 
the desire to report will increase positively if 
there is seriousness and responsibility to report 
of irregularities. The study also compared the 
seriousness and responsibilities of reports 
among several countries, such as France, 
Norway and USA. The research results show 
that Franceemphasis more on the responsibility 
and seriousness of handling reports than the 
Norway and USA.
Another study that proves the 
importance of the whistleblower report to 
be responded was conducted by Bucka dan 
Kleiner (2001), that whistleblowers will be 
disappointed or hurt if no one in the organization 
concerned listensto or even ignores the reports 
they make. So, if the reports are not acted 
upon, the whistleblowers will not report for 
the second time (PCaW, 2013). The result of 
this study is also supported by the result of the 
study conducted by Yeoh (2014)that the factor 
causing a person to be encouraged not to report 
fraud actions is not only in the form of threats, 
but also the absence of the seriousness of the 
organization in handling the fraud.
On the other hand, in the research 
conducted byBrewer dan Selden (1998), it is said 
that although the literature on whistle-blowing 
suggests that the success of complaints includes 
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reports will be handled, corrective actions 
will be done, and perpetrators (fraudsters) 
will be punished, yet the whistleblowers are 
not motivated by such ways. Based on the 
explanation described above, the second 
hypothesis proposed in this study is:
 H2: Follow up report has an effect on 
whistle-blowing interest.
The Effect of reward on Whistle-blowing 
Interest
Reinforcement theory says that if a 
behavior gets reward, the behavior will be 
repeated in the future. Conversely, if a behavior 
gets unpleasant reprisals or punishment, the 
behavior will not be repeated in the future. An 
employee will be enthusiastic if the institution 
where he works provides a reward program for 
the obligation to report fraud. If the employee 
is satisfied with the rewards earned and feels 
comparable to what he has done, the whistle-
blowing will be repeated. Conversely, if the 
employee knows that he will get retaliation or 
other negative threats after reporting fraud, the 
employee will not repeat the same thing.
The monetary reward program as a 
substitute for taking bribes is expected to make 
employees firmly refuse bribes and report 
the perpetrators. This strategy is done so that 
the employees who receive a relatively small 
salary or feel less do not tend to accept bribes 
(Stiegler, 2012). This program is powerful 
enough to encourage whistle-blowing because 
in addition to keeping the organization clean, 
the individuals will also receive rewards in 
return for reporting fraud.
One thing that cannot be denied is that 
a whistleblower will be motivated to report 
if there is guarantee of protection from the 
organization and the motivation that encourages 
him. This can be proved empirically in a study 
conducted by Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008), 
which indicates that auditors prefer to report 
fraudulent acts to the higher authorities if the 
organization provides a monetary reward or 
long-term employment contract. The result of 
this study is similar to the result of the research 
conducted by Ponemon (1994), that there 
is a significant influence between monetary 
rewards or long-term employment contracts 
that serve as incentives and the application of 
whistle-blowing systems.
In addition, Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) 
also mention that the presence of monetary 
incentives and the protection of employees 
can help foster a positive moral environment 
and increase the likelihood of whistle-blowing 
behavior within the organization. Therefore, 
to achieve an optimal role in encouraging the 
whistle-blowing interest of the organization 
itself, the employees need to be given a 
motivation to be more concerned about their 
work environment when there are indications 
of immoral or illegal actions.
In contrast, the research conducted 
by Brewer dan Selden (1998) reveals that 
the government employees or public are 
less motivated to be whistleblowers with the 
provision of monetary incentives and personal 
rewards, but the employees are motivated by 
the interests of others, high performance, job 
satisfaction, work commitments, self-sacrifice 
and the existence of work protection. In addition, 
Near et al., (1993) also finds quite an opposite 
result that although incentives can motivate 
and satisfy whistleblowers, the influence 
of monetary incentives can also produce 
biased information. Based on the explanation 
described above, the third hypothesis proposed 
in this study is:
 H3: Reward has an effect on whistle-
blowing interest.
Research Method
Types of Research and Sources of Data 
This research uses quantitative 
research. Sources of data in this study are using 
primary data. The primary data are derived 
from respondents’ answers to written questions 
(questionnaires) submitted by researchers.
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Population and Sampling Technique
Population in this research is all 
employees working at Pratama Tax Office 
of South Sidoarjo included in the scope of 
Regional Office of Directorate General of Tax 
(DGP) East Java Province. The number of 
employees of Pratama Tax Office is 76 people. 
Sample selection technique  used in this 
research is purposive sampling method.
Operational Definition of Variables
This study consists of three independent 
variables: anonymous reporting, follow up 
report, and reward; and one dependent variable, 
that is, whistle-blowing interest. The variables 
are measured by a 5-point Likert scale. The 
answers provided are score 1 (Strongly 
Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (Neutral), 4 (Agree), 
5 (Strongly Agree).
Data Quality Test
The research data quality test 
includes validity test and reliability test. Data 
management is done by using SPSS 21.0 for 
windows. The test will be valid if the value of 
r count > r table (Sujarweni, 2015:192), while 
the questionnaire instrument is considered 
reliable if it has Cronbach’s Alpa value > 0.60 
(Sujarweni, 2015:192).
Classical Assumption Test
The classical assumption test used in this 
study includes normality test, multicollinearity 
test, and heteroscedasticity test. Data normality 
test can be done using Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test. If Sig value > 0.05, the data is normally 
distributed, but if Sig value < 0.05, the data 
is not normally distributed (Sujarweni, 
2015:52). To know the presence or absence of 
multicollinearity in the regression model, one 
of them is done by using variance inflation 
factor (VIF) and tolerance value. If the VIF 
value generated is between 1 and 10, this means 
that there is no multicollinearity (Sujarweni, 
2015:185). The tolerance value  commonly used 
to indicate the presence of multicollinearity is 
a tolerance value ≤ 0.10 (Ghozali, 2013:107). 
Meanwhile, heteroscedasticity test can be done 
by Glejser test (Sujarweni, 2015:190), that 
is, by looking at the value of the probability 
significance of independent variables > 5%, 
then there is no heteroscedasticity (Ghozali, 
2013:143).
Hypothesis Testing
According to Sujarweni (2015: 155), to 
see the effect partially can be done using the 
following criteria:
1.	 If t count > t table or Sig < 0.05, H0 is rejected 
and Ha accepted. This shows that there is a 
significant influence between independent 
variable (X) and dependent variable (Y).
2.	 If t count < t table or Sig > 0.05, H0 is accepted 
and Ha is rejected. This shows that there is no 
significant influence between independent 
variable (X) and dependent variable (Y)
Results and Discussion
Characteristics of Respondents
This research is conducted to all tax 
employees working at Pratama Tax Office 
of South Sidoarjo which is included in the 
scope of Regional Office of Directorate 
General of Tax (DGT) East Java Province. The 
number of questionnaires distributed was 76 
questionnaires but only 53 questionnaires were 
returned. So the total questionnaires processed 
were 53.
Distribution of Questionnaires: Appendix 
Table 1
Description of the profile of Respondents: 
Appendix Table 2
Data Quality Test
The results of validity and reliability 
testing show that all variables in this study can 
be said to be valid because the r count values 
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of these variables are greater than r table with 
the Cronbach’s Alpha value  above 0.60. So, it 
can be concluded that all the variables proved 
reliable.
Validity Test Results: Appendix Table 3
Reliability Test Results: Appendix Table 4
Classical Assumption Test
The results of normality test in 
this study show the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
value of 0.636 and significance value of 
0.814 (significance > 0.05), indicating that 
the residual result has normal distribution. 
Multicollinearity test results show the tolerance 
value ≥ 0,10 or VIF value (Variance Inflation 
Factor) produced is between 1-10, indicating 
that in the multicollinearity test of the three 
independent variables, there is no correlation 
between variables or no multicollinearity. 
Heteroscedasticity in this study is done using 
Glejser Test. After testing, it can be concluded 
that all variables show a level of significance of 
more than 0.05, indicating that this regression 
model does not contain heteroscedasticity.
Normality Test Result: Appendix Table 5
Multicollinearity Test Results: Appendix 
Table 6
Heteroscedasticity Test Results: Appendix 
Table 7
Hypothesis Testing
Results of hypothesis testing using multiple 






Regression t count Sig. Note
Anonymous reporting 0.111 1.110 0.273 Not significant
Follow-up report 0.457 6.542 0.000 Significant
Reward 0.082 0.885 0.380 Not significant
Dependent: Individual interest to report fraud
Source: Processed Data
Results of Testing and Discussion of the 
Effect of Anonymous Reporting on Whistle-
blowing Interest
In Table 4.10 shows that anonymous 
reporting has t count value of 1.110 which is 
smaller than t table value of 2.0096, with the 
significance value of 0.273 which is greater than 
α = 0.05. It can be concluded that anonymous 
reporting has no effect on the whistle-blowing 
interest. Therefore, this result does not support 
the first hypothesis presented by the researchers, 
or H1 is rejected.
This result indicates that the anonymous 
reporting factor, which is used as a stimulus to 
boost the employee’s desire to report fraudulent 
actions, has negative result (no effect). The 
result of this study is in contrast to the results 
of the studies conducted by Gokce (2013), 
Kaplan dan Schultz (2007)there is concern 
that the addition of such a channel may de- 
crease the overall effectiveness compared to 
a system employing only non-anonymous 
reporting options. The rationale underlying this 
concern involves the would-be reporter\u2019s 
likelihood of reporting, the seriousness with 
which the organization treats an anonymous 
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report, and the organization\u2019s ability 
to thoroughly follow-up the report. Thus, we 
explore the extent to which the avail- ability 
of an anonymous reporting channel influences 
intended use of non-anonymous reporting 
channels. Further, in response to Sarbanes\
u2013Oxley and the envi- ronment of financial 
scandals that led to its passage, many firms are 
strengthening their internal audit departments, 
and providing them with greater independence 
from upper management\u2019s direct 
control. Accordingly, our examination tests 
whether the intended use of the internal audit 
department as an internal reporting channel 
is greater when the internal audit department 
is of \u2018\u2018high\u2019\u2019 versus \
u2018\u2018low\u2019\u2019 quality. Finally, 
the study investigates in- tended reporting 
behavior across three different cases (e.g., 
settings, Kaplan et al., (2009b)Sec. 301, Nayir 
dan Herzig (2012), Putri (2012), and Rahmatdi 
(2013), that anonymous reporting has a 
significant effect on the individual interest in 
reporting fraud.
Based on the processed data in this study 
indicates that although anonymous reporting 
can boost a person’s desire to report fraud as 
a result of the avoidance of a backlash threat, 
as previously stated in the study conducted 
by ACFE (2014), other aspects should also 
be considered if a person is willing to report 
fraud anonymously, as well as whether the 
anonymous reports are valid and reliable or 
not. So, anonymous reports are questionable 
and need to be traced to the truth because 
anonymous reports cannot be taken for granted. 
The statement is in line with Miceli dan Near 
(1994)data were analyzed with the case-control 
method, which is relatively unknown in the 
organiza- tional literature but is frequently used 
in medical research to examine the occurrence of 
rare diseases. Managerial retaliation w\u2019as 
more likel_v when: (1 that retaliation will be 
more likely to anonymous reports because the 
managerial side does not respond to and doubts 
the validity of the anonymous reports. Lewis 
(2006) also adds that the boss tends to prioritize 
the reports presented in confidentiality rather 
than anonymity, since anonymous reporting is 
more difficult to evaluate. Furthermore, if it is 
used for the investigation, anonymous reports 
result in fewer sources of investigation (Hunton 
and Rose, 2011) cited by (Sumantri, 2014). 
Thus, anonymous complaint reports appear to 
be in vain and on the other hand unprofitable 
for employees.
Given these perceptions, employees 
are reluctant to use anonymous reporting in 
uncovering fraud. The results of this study 
can indirectly support the research of whistle-
blowing conducted by (Sumantri, 2014), that 
if a fraudulent report is submitted in secret, it 
will likely contain slander or will increase the 
libel. Thus, this study also agrees with or in line 
with empirical study conducted by Near dan 
Miceli, (1995) which indicates that there is a 
doubt whether an anonymous report needs to 
be followed up or not.
Besides dealing with the credibility of 
a report that becomes an important point of 
anonymous channel, there are other aspects 
that need to be considered more closely if an 
organization implements anonymous channel 
reporting, that is, whether the report can be 
justified or not, because the study conducted by 
Near dan Miceli (1995) mentions that reports 
derived from anonymous channel can be 
false reports or defamation. Thus, anonymous 
reporting is still relatively weak because its 
validity level is still in doubt (Miceli dan Near, 
1994)data were analyzed with the case-control 
method, which is relatively unknown in the 
organiza- tional literature but is frequently used 
in medical research to examine the occurrence 
of rare diseases. Managerial retaliation w\
u2019as more likel_v when: (1.
In addition, another study which is in 
line with this research is the study conducted 
by Park et al., (2008), with the result that the 
anonymous reporting system perception, for 
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Turkish and United Kingdom students, is less 
desirable to apply (relatively low). Referring to 
the various consequences, anonymous reporting 
is not a simple matter in encouraging the 
successful implementation of whistle-blowing 
system. The messages contained in anonymous 
reports can lead to various speculations from 
organizations or individuals who are handling 
the report. PCaW (2006) presented in Brussels 
that:
“....the employee acted anonymously is often 
claimed as a sign of bad faith or dishonesty....”
Respondents in the study believe that 
anonymity is a matter to be considered carefully 
by considering the consequences that will be 
generated, because the respondents also do not 
want if the report he has submitted is  doubted 
and claimed as a lie report. The statement is 
shown with answers from the respondents as 
outlined in Figure 4.1 below.
Figure 4.1: Average Distribution of Respondents’ Answers 
     to Anonymous reporting
Scale
Figure 4.1 shows that the majority 
of respondents in this study rated below 3.7. 
This implies that anonymous reporting is 
between important and unimportant (Neutral) 
in the application of whistle-blowing system. 
This result is in line with the reporting system 
adopted by the Ministry of Finance, whereby 
the complainants may include and not include 
their identities when reporting alleged fraud.
Research on the confidentiality done by 
Sumantri (2014) obtained a small percentage. 
This is because the tax officers less agree with the 
guarantee of the confidentiality of the identity of 
the complainants. So, the results of the research 
conducted by Sumantri (2014) confirm that 
86% of respondents have perceptions that the 
whistleblower should notify his identity when 
reporting a case so as not to generate libel and 
defamation statements because the truth of the 
report is more taken into account and important 
than the whistleblower identity that is kept 
secret when making a fraudulent report.
In addition, the strong allegation of 
the negative effect of anonymous reporting on 
whistle-blowing interest is gender (since the 
proportion of male respondents of 64.2% is 
bigger than that of female respondents of 35.8 
%). Kaplan et al., (2009a), documented that 
there was a significant influence between the 
application of anonymous reporting channel 
and gender. The results explain that the 
largest percentage of those using anonymous 
reporting channel is female compared to men. 
The research considers that with anonymous 
reporting, the personal cost is less than non-
anonymous. Based on the research, it can be 
justified that this research is very rational if it 
gets results that have no effect, and this also 
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supports the research conducted by Kaplan et 
al., (2009a). 
Results of Testing and Discussion of the 
Effect of Follow Up Report on Whistle-
blowing Interest
Table 4.10 shows that follow up report 
has t count value of 6.542 which is greater than 
t table value of 2.0096, with significance value 
of 0.000 which is smaller than α = 0,05, hence 
it can be concluded that follow up report has 
an effect on individual interest in reporting 
fraud (whistle-blowing). The positive value of 
coefficient of regression indicates a positive 
relationship between follow up report and 
whistle-blowing interest. This means that the 
more the complaint report is acted upon, the 
higher the whistle-blowing interest.
These results indicate that the certainty 
that the report submitted by whistleblower will 
be followed up, which is one of the stimuli in 
this study, has resulted in an influential effect 
on encouraging a person’s interest in reporting 
fraud in his or her work agency. This study is 
in line with the result of the research conducted 
by Skinner (1958) that his reinforcement theory 
can move the attitude / behavior of individuals 
outside the reward factor.
In this study Skinner (1958) conducted 
experiments on gamblers. A gambler faces 
two major possibilities: win (positive) or lose 
(negative), although he loses gambling, he 
still repeats his activities (gambling). From the 
research, it can be drawn straight line, that the 
driving factor / encouragement of a person’s 
behavior or interest is not only in the form 
of incentive reward, but also satisfaction. A 
whistleblower will feel satisfied if the report 
submitted is appreciated or there is guarantee 
to be followed up.
In general, this is also in accordance 
with the nature of individual psychology 
that if a person gets attention, in which his 
behavior or action is appreciated, the behavior 
or action will be repeated in the future. This 
was evidenced by the statement of Hanafi 
(2003:319) in reinforcement theory, that if a 
behavior gets expected fun, the behavior will be 
repeated in the future. Conversely, if a behavior 
gets unpleasant reprisals or punishment, the 
behavior will not be repeated in the future.
This study is in line with the studies 
conducted by Lewis and Uys (2007) and PWC 
(2012), that whistle-blowing will be effective 
if each received complaint is warranted for 
investigation and follow-up. Furthermore, the 
result of the research conducted by Zimbelman 
et al., (2014:453) states that if whistle-blowing 
works effectively because of corrective action 
on the whistleblower report, this will encourage 
further reporting of violations.
This result is in line with previous 
research because the majority of respondents 
in this study agree that ensuring the certainty 
of follow up is essential for the success in the 
application of whistle-blowing. This is indicated 
by the average of respondents’ answers that are 
close to 4.0 (agree) as illustrated in Figure 4.2 
below.
Figure 4.2 shows that the average 
respondents agree that follow-up report has 
an important role in encouraging individuals 
to report fraud. In other words, the statistics 
imply that if a complaint report submitted 
by a whistleblower is not responded, the 
whistleblower will be reluctant to report the 
alleged fraud. Instead, the whistleblower will 
report fraudulent allegations if his report is 
responded and acted upon.
Scale
Figure 4.2: Average Distribution of Respondents’ Answers 
  to Follow Up Report
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In addition to the above explanation, 
the concrete evidence to support these findings 
is the statistical data presented in Table 4.1 
below. Although the statistics presented is 
a compilation of complaints from Internal 
and External, it is strong enough to explain 
the importance of guarantee that the report 
delivered by the whistleblower will be 
followed up or acted upon.  The guarantee will 
surely encourage the whistleblower to report 
allegations of fraud enthusiastically. 
Table 4.1
Report of Complaints Follow UP at DGT Period 2013 - 2014
Description Total Percentage %
The Number of Incoming Complaints in 2013
The Number of Complaints Followed Up in 2013







The Number of Incoming Complaints in 2014
The Number of Complaints Followed Up in 2014







Source: DGT Annual Report 2014
Table 4.11 above shows that in 2013 the 
DGT recipient or hotline operator followed up 
82% of complaint reports, and the remaining 
18% was still in follow-up process. As the 
implications of the number of complaints that 
had been followed up, the number of incoming 
complaints in 2014 was still consistent, 
indicating that there was no significant change 
/ decline. 91% of complaint reports in 2014 had 
been followed up and the remaining only 9% 
was still in the follow-up process.
So, from Table 4.11 above it can be 
concluded that if the recipient or verifier of the 
complaint is serious in handling all incoming 
complaint reports, from both internal and 
external whistleblower, the whistleblowers 
will consistently be interested in reporting 
the potential of fraud, so that the number 
of incoming complaints report from 2013 
to 2014 is still consistent and there is no 
significant decrease. In addition, as the form 
of the seriousness in handling and responding 
to complaints from both internal and external 
organizations, the Ministry of Finance issued 
a Regulation No. 149 / KMK.09 / 2011 which 
regulates the procedures for the management 
and follow-up of violation reporting and 
the management procedures of the violation 
reporting within the Ministry of Finance.
The result of the research conducted 
by PCaW (2013) indicates that when a 
whistleblower’s first complaint report is not 
responded, the whistleblower will not report 
for the second time. According to Bucka dan 
Kleiner (2001), this is because the whistleblower 
feels hurt and frustrated when no one responds 
and listens to his complaints. He is also afraid 
of having negative implications and becomes 
victims if his report is not immediately followed 
up. So, investigation is the best protection for 
whistleblowers ((Lewis dan Uys, 2007).
The result of this study is in line with 
the result of experimental study conducted by 
Schultz et al., (1993), that the desire to report 
will increase positively if there is seriousness 
and responsibility to report irregularities. 
However, this study is not in line with the result 
of a study conducted by Brewer dan Selden 
(1998) that the whistleblowers are not affected 
or motivated whether or not their reports are 
followed up.
Thus, this study confirms that the 
follow up report has a significant influence on 
the success of encouraging individuals to report 
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fraud. And the greater the form of enthusiasm 
of the agency’s response to a report made by 
whistleblowers, the more compelled they are 
to report the potential fraud occurring in their 
work environment.
Results of Testing and Discussion of the Effect 
of Reward on Whistle-blowing Interest
Table 4.9 shows that reward has t count 
value of 0.885 which is smaller than t table 
value of 2.0096 with the significance level of 
0.380 which is greater than α = 0,05. It can be 
concluded that reward has no effect on whistle-
blowing interest. Therefore, this result does 
not support the third hypothesis proposed by 
the researcher that reward has an effect on 
whistle-blowing interest, or in other words, H3 
is rejected.
This result confirms that the incentive 
rewards do not have an impact on employee 
enthusiasm in reporting fraud occurring in the 
workplace. In other words, the application of 
reinforcement programs in the form of incentive 
rewards in controlling the behavior, attitudes or 
interests of employees in revealing fraud has 
no relevance. Thus, it is very rational to argue 
that in reporting the fraud, the employees of 
Pratama Tax Office of South Sidoarjo are not 
influenced by external factor in the form of 
incentive reward. This indicates that they are 
driven by the internal factor within themselves.
The situation corresponds to the 
exposure of Remender (1980) that one of the 
essences of reinforcement theory is to put 
forward the intent and purpose of why a person 
behaves in a certain way. From the statement, it 
can be said that the employees of Pratama Tax 
Office of South Sidoarjo report wrongdoing not 
because of the reward / incentive program, but 
because they think that wrongdoing activities 
are something that must be fought or eradicated. 
This is in accordance with the statements given 
by Burgess and Akers (1966) and Remender 
(1980) that it would be much better if the 
inherent factor originates within the individual, 
or in other words, it runs naturally.
The result of this study contradicts 
the research conducted by Xu dan Ziegenfuss 
(2008), which found that internal auditors 
would be more inclined to report fraud to the 
higher authorities if there is internal incentive 
program within the organization. In addition, 
this study is also inconsistent with the results 
of research conducted by Ponemon (1994), 
Callahan and Dworkin (1992), Moberly (2012), 
Putri (2012), Stiegler (2012), Zhang (2008), 
Domfeh and Bawole (2011), which found that 
there was a significant influence between the 
monetary rewards being used as incentives and 
the application of whistle-blowing systems.
The result of this study is contrary to 
the results of previous studies, because in Table 
4.12 it is explained that from the 53 respondents, 
the minimum answer score chosen by the Tax 
office employees starting from score 1 (strongly 
disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (neutral), 4 (agree), to 
5 (strongly agree) on reward, they still answer 
the lowest score, that is, 1 (strongly disagree). 
This indicates that they disagree if the grant 
of financial incentives is used as a stimulus to 
encourage an interest in reporting fraud . The 
view can be seen in Table 4.3 below:
Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics
Indicator N Minimum Maximum
Question 1 53 1 5
Question 2 53 1 5
Question 3 53 1 5
Question 4 53 1 4
Question 5 53 1 4
Question 6 53 2 5
Question 7 53 2 4
Question  8 53 1 5
Source: Processed data
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Researchers assume that respondents 
are more interested in other rewards offered by 
the DGT as indicated by respondents’ answers 
to questions 1, 2, and 3. In other words, a 
number of respondents give category rating 
“strongly disagree” on those questions relating 
to financial rewards in encouraging individuals 
to report fraud. For the question number 1, the 
respondents who give rating “strongly disagree” 
is 2%, and “disagree” is 32%. For the question 
number 2, the respondents who give rating 
“strongly disagree” is 2%, “disagree” is 33%. 
And For the question number 3, the respondents 
who give rating “strongly disagree” is 2%, and 
“disagree” is 36%.
In addition to reward in the form of 
financial incentive, the DGT also provides 
other types of rewards such as certificates 
and promotions to echelon IV, echelon II 
appointments, job transfers, special promotions 
to extraordinary, short courses or trainin, or 
special benefits up to 10 times as much as the 
reported amount or other equivalent benefits 
(Sumantri, 2014).
The statement is in line with the 
results of the research conducted by Sumantri 
(2014) that examined the DGT employees and 
aimed to determine the level of appraisal of 
employees to the form of appreciation selected 
by the whistle-blower. The results show that 
the most dominant form of reward favored 
by the respondents is a mutation or rotation 
of positions 67%, second is promotion 53%, 
and 43% chooses a training or short course. 
Meanwhile, the monetary reward is at the 
lowest level 31%.
According to Sumantri (2014), 
economic incentives for whistleblowers can 
make corruption behavior more attractive 
and equilibrium corruption more stable in 
the organization. So, the research conducted 
by Sumantri (2014) rejects if the financial 
incentive is applied to encourage the interest of 
whistleblower.
The result is equivalent to a study 
conducted by PCaW (2013), that although 
American culture uses financial rewards for 
whistleblowers, the UK does not recommend a 
financial reward or incentive for whistleblowers 
because rewards are not a substitute for strong 
legal protection for whistleblowers. In addition, 
monetary rewards can damage the morale and 
identity of whistleblowers which can lead to 
reporting false reports due to ambition to obtain 
monetary rewards. This can also damage the 
credibility of the whistleblower because he will 
get a negative assessment.
Furthermore, the result of research 
conducted by Rahmatdi (2013) indicates 
that when there is retaliation, the intention of 
individuals to report fraud cannot be pushed by 
giving rewards. Similarly, although there is no 
retaliation, the individual intent to report fraud 
cannot be encouraged by giving rewards.
The stronger allegation that supports 
the result of this research is the empirical study 
conducted by Brewer and Selden (1998), that 
government or the public sector employees 
are less motivated to be whistleblowers with 
monetary rewards, but they are motivated by 
the interests of others, high performers , job 
satisfaction, work commitments, tasks, self-
sacrifice and the existence of work protection.
Therefore, to increase the effectiveness 
of the role of whistleblower, an organization 
should give attention to the level of accuracy 
and reliability of a report brought by the 
complainant with the assurance of protection 
from various threats or retaliation of potential 
perpetrators.
In addition, it would be better if 
the organization also pays attention to the 
Promoting Staff Awareness of Fraud through 
the provision of continuous training. Rachagan 
and Kuppusamy (2013) assert that one way 
to improve the effectiveness of the whistle-
blowing system within an organization is to 
brief all employees about what steps to take 
if wrongdoing takes place in the organization. 
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Thus, researchers believe that if employees 
have gained an understanding of the forms 
of fraud, the impact of fraud, the red flags or 
symptoms of a fraud and can identify the risk 
of fraud, the monetary loss due to fraud will 
decline and even could be avoided
It is necessary to reiterate in this research 
that the existence of sustainable education 
programs to increase employee awareness of 
fraud could be one of the best ways to combat 
fraud. In addition, the program is much better 
than rewarding and more efficient. As confirmed 
by the research conducted by KPMG (2006), 
in formulating a plan to combat fraud risks, an 
organization should pay attention to building 
a culture of awareness of fraud, with initiative 
adjustments to job functions that become the 
responsibility of employees.
Conclusion 
This study aims to examine the 
effectiveness of early detection principles 
issued by the Directorate General of Taxation 
(DGT) in boosting individual interest in 
reporting fraud. The results of this study show 
that statistically anonymous reporting has no 
effect on the individual’s desire to report fraud. 
This indicates that although they are given non-
reward stimulus in the form of availability of 
access to report wrongdoing anonymously, the 
respondents of Pratama Tax Office of South 
Sidoarjo are not encouraged to report fraud. 
In other words, they prefer non-anonymous 
reporting.
The finding related to the aspect of 
follow up report gets conflicting result. In 
other words, employees of Pratama Tax Office 
of South Sidoarjo will be motivated to report 
fraud occurring in the workplace if the report 
submitted gets full attention with the guarantee 
for follow-up. The greater the attention given 
to whistleblower complaints, the greater the 
interest of the employees to reveal the fraud. 
It is possible that this result can generalize to 
all employees in a cross-sector. This is because 
psychologically the individual who gets stimuli 
will feel appreciated if his complaint reports 
receive a positive response.
The results of this study empirically 
confirm that the giving of incentive reward 
has no effect on individual interest in reporting 
fraud. Based on the results of this study, it can 
be concluded that in revealing wrongdoing that 
occurs in the work place, the employees of 
Pratama Tax Office of South Sidoarjo are not 
driven by financial reward stimulus.
Suggestion
1. It is necessary that further researchers 
extend the research area
2. It is suggested that further researchers 
examine and assess whether the 
diversification of rewards can encourage 
employee interest in reporting fraud. 
This is because, giving a reward does 
not affect the individual interest in 
reporting fraud.
3. The last point is that the number of 
studies on whistle-blowing in Indonesia 
is still relatively few so there are still 
many variables beyond the scope of early 
detection principle that may influence 
the decision to become a whistleblower. 
It is suggested that further research add 
the status of wrongdoer variable because 
the variable will be the explanation of 
one of obstacles of wrongdoer.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1. Distribution and Collection of Question naires
Questionnaire              Total  
Number of employees of Pratama Tax Office of South Sidoarjo 76
Number of questionnaires distributed     76
Number of non-return questionnaires     23
Number of questionnaires returned and analyzed   53
Lampiran Tabel 2. Deskripsi Profil Responden
 Description     Total  Percentage%
Gender
       Female     19  35.8%
       Male     34  64.2%
Age
<25 years     2  3.8%
       25-35 years    35  66.0%
       35-54 years    15  28.3%   
>54 years     1  1.9%
Length of employment
       1-5 years     15   28.3%
       6-10 years    25   47.2%
       >11 years     13   24.5%
Last education
       Associate’s degree   13   24.5%
       Bachelor’s degree   31   58.5%
       Master’s degree    9   16.9% 
       Doctoral degree    0    0
Understanding of Whistle-blowing System
Do not understand    0    0
       Understand    53    100%
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Appendix Table 3. Validity Test Results
       Part A: Anonymous Reporting (X1)
       Question   r-count  r-table  Description 
       Question 1  0.780  0.271  Valid
       Question 2  0.636  0.271  Valid
       Question 3  0.672  0.271  Valid
       Question 4  0.666  0.271  Valid
       Question 5  0.615  0.271  Valid
       Question 6  0.558  0.271  Valid
       Question 7  0.633  0.271  Valid
       Question 8  0.561  0.271  Valid
Part B: Follow Up Report (X2)
       Question   r-count  r-table  Description
       Question 1  0.597  0.271  Valid
       Question 2  0.883  0.271  Valid
       Question 3  0.833  0.271  Valid
       Question 4  0.672  0.271  Valid
       Question 5  0.877  0.271  Valid
       Question 6  0.833  0.271  Valid
       Question 7  0.883  0.271  Valid
       Question 8  0.672  0.271  Valid
       Question 9  0.597  0.271  Valid
       Question 10  0.672  0.271  Valid
       Question 11  0.547  0.271  Valid
       Part C: Reward (X3)
       Question   r-count  r-table  Description
       Question 1  0.634  0.271  Valid
       Question 2  0.678  0.271  Valid
       Question 3  0.614  0.271  Valid
       Question 4  0.658  0.271  Valid
       Question 5  0.597  0.271  Valid
       Question 6  0.576  0.271  Valid
       Question 7  0.566  0.271  Valid
       Question 8  0.588  0.271  Valid
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Part D: Whistle-blowing interest (Y)
       Question   r-count  r-table  Description 
       Question 1  0.816  0.271  Valid
       Question 2  0.532  0.271  Valid
       Question 3  0.473  0.271  Valid
       Question 4  0.717  0.271  Valid
       Question 5  0.625  0.271  Valid
       Question 6  0.833  0.271  Valid
       Question 7  0.474  0.271  Valid
       Question 8  0.833  0.271  Valid
Appendix Table 4. Reliability Test Results
 Variable         Cronbach’s Alpha    Reliability     Description
Anonymous reporting (X1)       0.795          0.60        Reliable
Follow up report (X2)       0.912          0.60        Reliable
Reward (X)             0.763          0.60        Reliable
 
Whistle-blowing interest (Y)        0.804          0,60        Reliable
 
Appendix Table 5. Normality Test Results
    Unstandardized Residual  Description
Kolmogorov-smirnov z            0.636
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)   0.814    Normally distributed
Appendix Table 6. Multicollinearity Test Results
Variable Tolerance  VIF  Description
X1  0.887   1.127  No Multicollinearity
X2  0.886   1.129  No MulticollinearityX3  0.998   1.002  No Multicollinearity
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Appendix Table 7. Heteroscedasticity Test Results
       Variable   Sig.   Description 
X1   0.476  No Heteroscedasticity
X2   0.071  No Heteroscedasticity
 X3   0.661  No Heteroscedasticity
